Gibbs Case Factum


The Council of Canadians with Disabilities intervenes in this case, with leave, in order to advance the general perspective of people with disabilities. The members of CCD member organizations (see application for intervenor status) are people with mental and physical and invisible and visible disabilities. It is hoped that their collective experience of living with stigma and stereotype will assist the Court in understanding the issues in this case and advancing the law as it affects the rights of people with disabilities.


  1. The Intervenor Council of Canadians with Disabilities (the CCD) relies on the facts as set out by the Respondents, central among which are the following:

  2. Betty-Lu Clara Gibbs was an employee of the Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. She had a mental disability, and became unable to work, in November, 1987.

  3. Ms. Gibbs was able to claim income replacement benefits under the terms of a collective agreement negotiated between her employer (the Appellant) and her trade union. These benefits were paid to her for 24 months. At that point they terminated because she had a mental disability.

  4. Ms. Gibbs had a mental disability that did not require her to be confined to an institution. Her income replacement benefits would have continued past 24 months if she had been institutionalized.

  5. At the hearing of Ms. Gibbs' complaint, no evidence was tendered by the employer to explain or justify the limitation on income replacement benefits received by people with mental disabilities who are living in the community.


  6. The issue is whether an employer discriminates on the basis of disability, contrary to section 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, when the disability plan it provides to its employees as a term of their employment contains a limitation on the benefits an employee may receive when the cause of her disability is a nervous, mental or emotional disorder.

  7. The issue in this case is whether new limitations should be placed on the definition of discrimination against people with mental disabilities. What is not at issue here is the interpretation of statutory defences that might otherwise have been available had the Appellant chosen to rely on them, or the justificatory standard to be applied once a prima facie case of discrimination is made out under section 16(1) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.



  8. People with disabilities are historically disadvantaged people: "Historically, the disabled have been stigmatized and shunned by our society. Ancient attitudes based upon ignorance and fear pervade many ideas about disabled members of our society. For many disabled persons, the greatest handicap many disabled individuals experience is not the limitations imposed by their disability, but the attitude of others toward their disability. These attitudes are deeply ingrained and frequently function at a sub-conscious level."

    Battlefords v. Gibbs, Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, per Jackson J. at 19

  9. Specifically, people with mental disabilities have faced unique forms of historical disadvantage. "People who are mentally disabled have traditionally been devalued individuals in Canadian society. History has seen large numbers institutionalized for life upon the erroneous assumption that custodial care was the only appropriate course of action. They have been the subject of ridicule, massive segregation, community insensitivity, needless sterilization and unfounded stereotyping."

    Battlefords v. Gibbs, Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, per Jackson J. at 20, quoting from Vickers and Endicott, "Miles to Go: Some Personal Reflections on the Social Construction of Disability" (1992) 14 Dalhousie L.J. 526 at 526

  10. The argument advanced in this case by the Appellant would mean the perpetuation of the historical disadvantage of people with mental disabilities in the context of human rights legislation which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in their employment. It would mean acceptance of the stigma associated with mental disability and approval of the stereotypical assumptions which are often made about people with mental disabilities in their employment contracts and insurance benefits.

  11. Stereotypes about mental illness underlie the disadvantage that people with mental illness may face in employment situations or with insurance schemes:

    Stigma against mentally ill persons is so pervasive that it affects every aspect of their lives. It brings with it a multitude of problems, from insurance, to housing, to jobs; stigma stops patients from getting the best treatment, or at times from getting any treatment at all.

    Historically, people with psychiatric illnesses have been stigmatized. Such stigma pervades writings from medieval to modern times. Mental illness was once thought to be related to being possessed with demons. In more recent times, while such concepts are no longer prevalent, patients with mental illness continue to be viewed as constitutionally weak, dangerous and responsible for their own plight. It is interesting to take special note that although patients with other illnesses such as tuberculosis or epilepsy were once stigmatized, patients with these illnesses no longer suffer the social ostracism that they once experienced. However, prejudice against patients with mental illness persists unabated.

    Fink and Tasman, Stigma and Mental Illness, 1992, American Psychiatric Press Inc., page 1

  12. The impact of stigma cannot be under-estimated:

    During his term as president of the American Psychiatric Association, Dr. Paul Fink, a tireless advocate of patients' rights, stated 'Today stigma against those with psychiatric illness and those who treat them is the single most destructive element impeding progress in the care of the mentally ill.

  13. In particular the CCD is concerned about those aspects of the Appellant's argument which would have severe implications for people with mental disabilities:

    1. the insurance policy which forms part of Ms. Gibbs' terms of employment perpetuates incorrect myths about people with mental disabilities, namely, that their disability is less "real" or legitimate than physical disabilities, and is suspect unless verified by the fact of institutionalization;

    2. the requirement of institutionalization is not in line with policies advanced by people with disabilities in support of independent living, autonomy, and integration into the larger community. The options for Ms. Gibbs are to work (something she is unable to do because of her mental disability), to go into custodial care, or to lose her income;

    3. the policy discriminates against people who are institutionalized because of a mental disability as it deprives them of the income necessary to leave the institution and re-integrate into society. But for a mental disability, individuals such as Ms. Gibbs would be able to collect income replacement benefits beyond the initial 24 months;

    4. this incentive for institutionalization is in conflict with the constitutional values of equality, liberty and security of the person which are guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter);

      Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11

    5. the Appellant's argument would effectively revive and rehabilitate the old formal equality analysis or similarly situated test which was rejected by this Court in Andrews and, in the context of human rights legislation, in the Brooks case;

      Andrews v. Law Society, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143

      Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219

    6. the principles enunciated by this Court in Zurich Life Insurance v. Ontario are inappropriate to a determination of the issues in this appeal. deals with the justifiability of discrimination once it is found to exist. Here the Appellant denies discrimination. Consequently, the issue to be determined by this Court is whether or not the Appellant has discriminated against Ms. Gibbs because of her mental disability. The case does not extend to statutory defences not relied upon by the Appellant or the justificatory standard to be applied once discrimination is made out. Therefore, the Court should be reluctant to make such a determination without a proper evidentiary record before it.

    Zurich Life Insurance v. Ontario, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321

  14. It is illustrative to look at the movement towards de-institutionalization of people with mental disabilities in the context of this case. The fact is that there is a trend away from the institutionalization and hospitalization of people with mental disabilities:

    "There has been a considerable reduction in the number of patients in most psychiatric hospitals in Western countries. ... The deinstitutionalization movement, which has been observed throughout Canada since the early 1960s, has continued steadily for over 30 years. However, care of patients in psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units of general hospitals still consumes most of the financial resources devoted to mental health. In the late 1980s, these institutions were receiving about 85% of the relevant resources in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec. In Saskatchewan, a more rural province, the hospitals were receiving 40% of the resources (Rochefort, 1992). This province was in the vanguard of de-institutionalization, especially with respect to the transfer of resources for persons with mental disorders to community services (Lafave and Grunberg, 1974).

  15. Current thinking about mental health regards institutionalization as an option of last resort, usually for the protection of the individual or for the protection of others. Whether or not a person is unable to work because of a mental illness is an entirely separate question from whether or not a person requires institutional care.

  16. Indeed, in 1990 the Saskatchewan Commission on Directions in Health Care made a number of recommendations that related to mental health. These included a) decentralization of authority and responsibility for mental health services, b) local co-ordination of community mental health services, c) establishment of a provincial Mental Health Commission, and d) new funds for community-based initiatives. As of 1992, some additional funding had been provided for enhanced community-based services on the basis of these recommendations.

  17. Had Ms. Gibbs been institutionalized rather than living in the community, the terms of employment would have allowed her to continue to receive income replacement benefits. This creates a) an incentive to become institutionalized and b) greater barriers to de-institutionalization of people with mental disabilities..

  18. The CCD submits that the institutional exception is derived from the following discriminatory assumptions:

    1. mental illness or disability is more likely to be feigned if the person is not incarcerated in an institution;

    2. no one could be so sick from a mental illness or disability that they couldn't work unless they were hospitalized or institutionalized;

    3. people have a mental illness or disability need to be segregated from the rest of society for their own protection and the protection of others.


  19. Although the following principles are now well-accepted by the Court, the significance of this case warrants their repetition.

    Broad, Liberal and Purposive Interpretation

  20. Human rights legislation must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve the fundamentally important objectives of such legislation:

    ... To begin with, we must consider the nature and purpose of human rights legislation. The preamble provides the guide... There we find enunciated the broad policy of the Code and it is this policy which should have effect. ... Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary — and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.

    O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, per McIntyre, J. at 546-7

  21. This view of the significance of human rights legislation in fact pre-dates the Charter:

    When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive statement of the "human rights" of the people living in that jurisdiction, then there is no doubt in my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have through their legislature clearly indicated that they consider that law, and the values it endeavours to buttress and protect are, save their constitutional laws, more important than all others. Therefore, short of that legislature speaking to the contrary in express and unequivocal language in the Code or in some other enactment, it is intended that the Code supersede all other laws when conflict arises.

    Ins. Corp. of B.C. v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145, per Lamer J. at 158

  22. The Court has continued to acknowledge the "unique nature" and "privileged status" of human rights legislation. In U.B.C. v. Berg, the Court considered a complaint of discrimination based on mental disability, and, in the CCD's view, correctly found that a violation of the statute had occurred. At the same time, the Court acknowledged the limited scope of the issues in the case itself.

    U.B.C. v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353

    The Application of Charter Jurisprudence

  23. Jurisprudence arising under the equality guarantees in section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to the interpretation of the meaning of discrimination in human rights legislation. The Court in human rights cases can and does take guidance from its reasoning in equality rights cases argued under section 15 of the Charter , which guarantees equality without discrimination. The Court in Andrews drew on its reasoning in a human rights case in a passage which has come to be recognized as the signature definition of discrimination:

    ... I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed on others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits and advantages available to other members of society.

    Andrews v. Law Society, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, per McIntyre J. at 173-5, quoted with approval in Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, per Dickson C.J. at 1234-5

  24. The CCD submits that there are two steps in the analysis of a claim of discrimination: (a) whether or not a prima facie case of discrimination is established; (b) if so, whether or not the discrimination can be justified by a statutory defence. In the CCD's submission, the issue to be determined by this Court concerns only the first stage of analysis: whether or not the Appellant's employment benefits plan is discriminatory. It is submitted that the Court does not need to deal with the second stage of the analysis, or the issue of justification, within the confines of the case at bar, as the Appellant has not relied upon any statutory defence available to it.

  25. Moreover, for the reasons stated by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, the CCD submits that it would be detrimental to the interests of people with disabilities for the Court to attempt to read in a justificatory standard given the lack of any record before the Court on these issues. For this reason the CCD agrees with the other Intervenors in this appeal that the Court's determination in this case should be limited to the issue of whether or not the Appellant's actions are discriminatory.

    The Application of International Covenants

  26. In interpreting human rights legislation the Court has indicated that it will take guidance from international obligations which Canada has made by signing international covenants, through the light which they shed on the interpretation of values expressed in the Charter and other rights-protecting statutes:

    There are many diverse values that deserve protection in a free and democratic society such as that of Canada, only some of which are expressly provided for in the Charter. ... Especially in light of Canada's ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ... and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work ... it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one. In Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at page 349:

    The content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of the "full benefit of the Charter's protection." I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.

    Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, per Dickson C.J. at 1056-7

  27. This view was in fact made by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 1985:

    ...The protection and enforcement of human rights has increasingly become an important national and international goal. Indeed, the province of Saskatchewan has for many years been in the forefront of the protection of human rights and dignity. At the international level the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16th December 1966 and became effective 23rd March 1976. On 16th May 1976 Canada became a party to the covenant and its Optional Protocol. Saskatchewan legislation, for the most part, gives effect to the rights protected in the international covenant. On 9th December 1975 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed Resolution 347

    (XXX) Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons. Sections 3 and 8 of that resolution provide as follows:

    "3. Disabled persons have the inherent right to respect for their human dignity. Disabled persons, whatever their origin, nature and seriousness of their handicaps and disabilities, have the same fundamental rights as their fellow citizens ...

    "8. Disabled persons are entitled to have their special needs taken into consideration at all stages of economic and social planning."

    Can. Odeon Theatres v. Huck, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 717 at 735-6


  28. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code makes it illegal to discriminate against someone in respect of their employment because they have a disability. This statute occupies a place of importance which although "not quite constitutional" is "more than the ordinary" and is to be given a "broad, liberal and purposive" interpretation. This approach is to overcome and prohibit the discrimination which results from the stigma and stereotyping of people with disabilities, among other factors.

  29. Ms. Gibbs suffered from a mental disability which rendered her unable to work. She was discriminated against with respect to a term of her employment because she had a mental disability. Had she been unable to work for some reason other than a mental disability, she would have received full benefits.

  30. The term of employment in this case reflects a stigmatization of people with mental disabilities. The existence of stigma and stereotype must be assessed in the context of the historical disadvantage of people with mental disabilities. In that context, exclusions such as that at issue in this case reinforce historical stigma and stereotype.

  31. The discrimination experienced by Betty-Lu Clara Gibbs arises from the assumptions which are made about her, and the benefits which are denied her, based on the stereotypes associated with her mental disability. The discrimination experienced by Ms. Gibbs is not just to be measured by comparison to any one group of people. It must be measured with reference to people with other types of mental disabilities, physical disabilities and the non-disabled population in general. It must also be measured by the assumptions which are made about Ms. Gibbs, as a person with a mental disability, and the benefits which are denied her because of her disability.


  32. This case is about inability to work. It is about discrimination which arises from the stigma against a group of people who are protected by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code and the Charter: people with mental disabilities. It is about discrimination which is clearly prohibited by the reasoning in the Brooks case. The situation of pregnant women in that case is directly analogous with that of mentally disabled people in this case.

    Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219

  33. The Intervenor CCD adopts the analysis of the Respondent and the Intervenors OHRC and CMHA of Zurich Life Insurance v. Ontario. In Zurich discrimination was conceded. The question was whether or not it was justifiable, having regard to the provision of the Ontario Human Rights Code regarding distinctions made on reasonable and bona fide grounds. This is an entirely distinct issue from that in the case at bar, in which the Appellant denies that discrimination exists. A finding of discrimination is the very issue in question. Attempts to rely on Zurich in the circumstances of this case serve only to obscure a purposive approach to the application of the Human Rights Code to the equality rights of people with mental disabilities.

    Zurich, supra

  34. The Appellant's argument clearly follows the reasoning of the Court in Bliss which was overturned in Brooks v. Canada Safeway. Indeed it is the CCD's position that the reasons of this Court in Brooks will lead it unambiguously to reject the Appellant's argument in this case.

  35. In the case at bar a group of individuals who are unable to work because of a disability have been singled out and denied benefits based on their membership in a group that has a history of discrimination. In Brooks a group of women unable to work for health-related reasons was singled out and denied benefits based on their membership in a group with a history of discrimination. In neither case were the particular individuals who would be ultimately disadvantaged known, but in both cases it was known that those disadvantaged would be excluded based on membership in an historically disadvantaged group.

  36. Brooks dealt with the exclusion from insurance benefits of pregnant employees for the ten weeks preceding and six weeks following birth. The question was whether or not this was discrimination prohibited by the Manitoba Human Rights Act. The Court found that "it is beyond dispute that pregnant employees receive significantly less favourable treatment under the Safeway plan than other employees. For a seventeen week period, pregnant women are not entitled to any compensation under the plan, regardless of the reason they are unable to work. ... The plan singles out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment, in comparison with any other health reason which may prevent an employee from reporting to work. With the sole exception of pregnancy, eligibility for compensation under the plan is available on broad and general terms."

    Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 at 1236

  37. The CCD submits that the same is true in this case with respect to the different treatment accorded people after 24 months of inability to work. The plan singles out those who have a mental disability who are living in the community, and denies them income replacement benefits otherwise available to individuals covered by the Appellant's plan.

  38. In Brooks the employer advanced several arguments in support of the proposition that the disability plan did not discriminate. The Court rejected all of them. Guidance can be taken for the case at bar from the Court's reasons for rejecting those arguments:

    The first two claims, that pregnancy is neither an accident nor an illness and that it is voluntary are closely related. I agree entirely that pregnancy is not characterized properly as a sickness or an accident. It is, however, a valid health-related reason for absence from the workplace and as such should not have been excluded from the Safeway plan. .. The underlying rationale of this plan is the laudable desire to compensate persons who are unable to work for valid health-related reasons. Pregnancy is clearly such a reason. ... It seems indisputable that in our society pregnancy is a valid health-related reason for being absent from work. ... Viewed in its social context pregnancy provides a perfectly legitimate health-related reason for not working and as such it should be compensated by the Safeway plan. In terms of the economic consequences to the employee resulting from the inability to perform employment duties, pregnancy is no different from any other health-related reason for absence from the workplace.

    Furthermore, to not view pregnancy in this way goes against one of the purposes of anti-discrimination legislation. This purpose, which was noted earlier in the quotation from Andrews, ... is the removal of unfair disadvantages which have been imposed on individuals or groups in society. Such an unfair disadvantage may result when the costs of an activity from which all of society benefits are placed upon a single group of persons. This is the effect of the Safeway plan. ...

    In sum, if an employer such as Safeway enters into the field of compensation for health conditions and then excludes pregnancy as a valid reason for compensation, the employer has acted in a discriminatory fashion."

    Brooks, supra at 1237-38

  39. The parallel argument in the case at bar is that being absent from work due to a medical condition which renders the employee unable to work is a valid reason for such absence. After 24 months a continuing absence for the same medical reason is "no different from any other health-related reason for absence from work." We note once again that no evidence was called to explain or justify the 24-month termination of benefits.

  40. The Court also noted in Brooks that the insurance plan in that case provided benefits for part of the term of pregnancy. The CCD submits that this is directly on point with respect to the case at bar:

    It is also noteworthy that the plan by its own terms does not exclude pregnancy-related absence from compensation for the major part of the nine months of pregnancy. Although a normal pregnancy is somewhat less than forty weeks in duration, pregnant women, under the plan, are not disentitled until ten weeks before the anticipated week of childbirth. During the first twenty-nine weeks of pregnancy, Safeway does not refuse to compensate pregnant employees on the ground that pregnancy is neither an accident nor an illness. It is not compelling to argue that pregnancy is not compensated after twenty-nine weeks because it is a voluntary condition when, to that point, pregnancy has been compensated under the sickness and disability plan.

    Brooks, supra, at 1239

  41. The CCD argues that precisely the same point is relevant for the case at bar: it is not acceptable to argue that disability should not be compensated after 24 months for reasons which are not even advanced by the employer or the insurance company.

  42. The employer's third argument in Brooks was that it had no intention to discriminate. The Court rejected this argument and in the CCD's submission any similar argument advanced by the Appellant in this case ought to be rejected as well.

    Brooks, supra, at 1240

  43. The employer's fourth argument in Brooks was that the insurance benefits were not discriminatory but merely underinclusive of the potential risks it could conceivably insure. It relied on American authorities which however the Court dismissed as unhelpful because of the requirement in U.S. law to find "invidious intent", a requirement unknown in Canadian human rights jurisprudence. The CCD notes in addition the Court's comment that "underinclusion may just be a backhanded way of permitting discrimination."

    Brooks, supra at 1240

  44. The Court went on to find that discrimination based on pregnancy is sex or gender discrimination, rejecting its reasoning in Bliss that "...any inequality between the sexes in this area is not created by legislation but by nature," and that different treatment under the Unemployment Insurance Act was because of pregnancy and not because of gender.

    Brooks, supra at 1242-43

  45. The Appellant in the case at bar argues, in paragraph 31 of their factum, that " was impossible to identify at the outset of coverage who would be affected by the restrictive terms of clause 10.6 of the policy. Those terms could have been engaged with respect to any of the Co-op's employees or with respect to none of them. The contingent nature of the benefits made it impossible to ascertain the effect of clause 10.6 on any individual employee until after he or she had become disabled." And in paragraph 32: "As it presently reads, the Policy provides the same coverage to absolutely every Co-op employee and protects them equally against the prospect of disability." This is precisely the point which the Supreme Court of Canada made in Bliss, when quoting with approval from the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal:

    ...Assuming the respondent to have been "discriminated against," it would not have been by reason of her sex. Section 46 applies to women, it has no application to women who are not pregnant, and it has no application, of course, to men. If section 46 treats unemployed pregnant women differently from other unemployed persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are pregnant and not because they are women.

    Bliss, supra, overturned by Brooks v. Canada Safeway, supra, per Dickson C.J. at 1243

  46. The error in Bliss, and in the reasoning of the Appellant in this case, is the application of the similarly situated test. That test provides that the right to equality only applies to persons who are similarly situated and that a law or policy need only apply equally to those to whom it has application.

    Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, per McIntyre J. at 165-168

  47. This reasoning was rejected in Andrews and in Brooks. Andrews points out that this reasoning excludes any consideration of the nature of the law and could be used to justify blatant discrimination, including "the formalistic separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. k637 (1896)."

    Andrews, supra

  48. The CCD urges the Court to reject the argument of the Appellant which would deny benefits to a woman unable to work because she is mentally disabled and is living in the community. The Appellant's argument depends on an application of the similarly situated test: "The Co-op merely provides different insurance benefits in relation to mental and physical disability. All employees receive precisely the same protection against the possibility that they will become disabled." See the Appellant's factum, page 9, paragraph 25.

  49. The Appellant's focus on the situational or formal equality of potential recipients of insurance benefits in relation to each other - parallel to the formal or situational equality of men and women to receive unemployment insurance benefits - ignores the substantive inequality resulting from historical disadvantage which it is the purpose of human rights legislation to prohibit. The Court's reasoning in Brooks and Andrews must lead to a rejection of the Appellant's argument in the case at bar.


The Intervenor the Council for Canadians with Disabilities supports the request of the Respondents, Ms. Gibbs and the Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, that the appeal of the Appellant be dismissed.

All of which is respectfully submitted this 3rd day of April, 1996, at Vancouver, British Columbia.


Solicitor for the Intervenor CCD



Andrews v. Law Society, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 6,9,10,14,17

Battlefords v. Gibbs, Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, Case on Appeal 4

Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 6,10,13,14,15,16,17,18

Canadian Odeon Theatres v. Huck, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 717 11

Insurance Corp. of B.C. v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 9

O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 8,9

Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 11

U.B.C. v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 9

Zurich Life Insurance v. Ontario, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321 6,7,13

Scholarly Authorities

Fink and Tasman, Stigma and Mental Illness, 1992, American Psychiatric Press Inc. 5

Lesage and Morissette, "Residential and Palliative Needs of Persons with Severe Mental Illness who are Subject to Long-term Hospitalization," Canada's Mental Health, Summer 1993 7

MacNaughton, "Canadian Mental Health Policy: The Emergent Picture," Canada's Mental Health, March 1992 7,8

Myers, Michael F., "Psychiatric Illness in Physicians...", Humane Medicine, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1994 5


The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 3,11,12

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c. 11 6,9,10,11,12,20